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Abstract 
An &-substitution is a uniform replacement of n-ary predicates Q” by n-ary ‘complex’ 
predicates, that is, by formulas containing al the name form variables of Q”. (In propositional 
logic, s-substitutions coincide standard substitutions for propositional variables.) Formula A is 
more E-general than B if A is an s-substitution instance of B but not vice versa. Every theorem of 
a given logic L is an E-instance of a most E-general L-theorem. Gen,(L) denotes the clas of L’s 
most s-general theorems. Is Gen,(L) axiomatizable? We prove that for any recursively enumer- 
able (r.e.) logic L extending intuitionistic proportional or first order logic, Gen,(L) is r.e. only if 
L is decidable. The theorem stil holds if L includes modal operators. One of its consequences is 
that most general first order theorems are not axiomatizable. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Preliminaries 
Throughout the following, A, B . . . denote formulas of the formal language Y and 
r, A . . . denote sets of such formulas. The variable r~ ranges over substitution functions 
for propositional variables or predicate letters. Formula A is an instance of B iff (if and 
only if) A = a(B) holds for some r~; A is a proper instance of B iff A is an instance of 
B but B is not an instance of A. Formula A is less general than or equally general as B, 
in short A < m B, iff there exist alphabetic variants A’ and B’ of A and B, respectively, 
such that A’ is an instance of B’. Thereby, an alphabetic variant of A is a formula 
resulting from A by a correct relettering of bound variables (cf., e.g. [l, p. 621 
for the obvious inductive definition); relettering of bound variables does not 
change degre of generality. Formula A is less general than B, in short A cd B 
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(equivalently: B is more general than A, B is a proper generalization of A) iff A < ., B but 
not B <= A. It follows that if A c ,, B, then there exist alphabetic variants A’ and B’ of 
A and B, resp., such that A’ is a proper instance of B’. Finally, A is equally general as B, 
in short A z d B, iff A Go B and B Gd A. Because o-substitutions are transitive and 
reflexive (see Section 2), the relation <, defines a partial quasi-ordering of the 
formulas of 3 and a partial ordering of the quotient set of 5? modulo =,. The 
ordering relation < 0 is extended to inferences r I- A as follows. An alphabetic variant 
r’ of r consists of alphabetic variants of the formulas in r (one for each), and 
o(T) := {a(A) 1 AE~). Then (d I-B) <O (r I-A) iff there exist alphabetic variants d’, 
B’, r’, A’ of A, B, r, A, resp., such that A’ = a(T’) and B’ = a(A’) holds for some 6. 
Every logic (in the usual sense of this notion) and in particular every propositional 
or first order logic L is closed under o-substitution (Section 2); hence, o(L) = L holds 
(where L is identified with the set of its theorems). A theorem of a given logic L is 
called most general iff it is not less general than any other L-theorem. Similar for most 
general L-inferences r FL A. (Given the usual definition r F-L A iff //\r, + A E L, where 
lI\r, is the conjunction of a finite subset of r, then r t-r A is most general iff A\r, + A 
is so.) Consider the following examples: (1) ((pI A pz + q) A (pl A p2)) + q, (2) 
((P + 4)AP) + 4, (3) PA9 -+ P”% (4) P”9 + P”r> (5) gYVx(Fx + GUY)-’ 
Vx3y(Fx + Gxy), (6) 3yVxRxy -+ Vx3yRxy. Formulas (l)-(6) are all theorems of 
classical ogic, but only (2), (4) and (6) are most general theorems; (1) is less general 
than (2) via the substitution a(p) = p1 A pz, (3) is less general than (4) via a(r) = q, and 
(5) is less general than (6) via a(Rxy) = (Fx + Gxy). 
Of course, generality of theorems can be understood also w.r.t. (with respect o) 
substitutions for individual variables - e.g., Ff( x) v 1 F’(x) is not most general, while 
Fx v 1 Fx is most general in this respect. This is a well-investigated topic in auto- 
mated theorem proving which shall not concern us here; we are solely concerned with 
generality w.r.t. substitutions for propositional variables or predicate letters. Let 
Gen,( L) denote the set of L’s most general theorems. Gen,( L) is a proper subset of L; 
informally speaking, the subset of its most interesting theorems. The question we are 
considering here is to which extent he subset Gen,(L) of an axiomatizable logic L can 
itself be axiomatized. We give three examples of the interest of this question. 
1.2. Theorem proving 
To prove theorems in the shortest possible way is a desideratum of all (automated) 
theorem provers. In many cases, proving a theorem via proving its most general 
version will be a good heuristic device for finding a short proof. Consider, as a simple 
example, how a standard resolution theorem prover proves the inference 
(PI A ... Apn) + (ql h ‘a. A qol), (pt A ... Ap.) t-,(qI A .+. r\qR1). It will assume the 
premises and the negation of the conclusion, convert them into clausal form, and then 
will derive I by iterated application of the resolution rule. The standard procedure of 
conversion into clausal form will produce the following set of m + n + 1 clauses: 
{lpi v *a. Vlp”VqiI 1 d i < m} u {pi/ 1 < i < n} u (lql v .a. vlq,). In order 
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to prove I from this set of clauses, the resolution proof tree will produce 
m.n + M = m.(n + 1) branching points: it has to resolve each clause 
1p1 v **- v lp,, v qi (1 < i < m) with each of the atomic clauses pi (1 < i < n) in 
order to obtain qi, and then each qi with lql v ..a vlq,. It would be much more 
economically, of course, to prove this inference by proving its most general version, 
which is p + q, p l-Lq (via the substitution function o(p) = (pl A ... up,) and 
Q(q)=(qlA ... A qm)). It translates into clausal form as 1 p v q, p, 1 q l-L I and is 
proved with only two branching points. 
Standard resolution does not take care of generality. How could a theorem prover 
which always proofs the most general version of a theorem look like? The easiest 
possibility is a forward chaining natural deduction theorem prover. Its theorems are 
sequents, i.e. inferences of the form A l-LB with A possibly empty. They are proved 
from a given set of sequent axioms (of the form r FL A) and a given set of sequent rules 
(oftheformdl~LB1,(dz~LBz,... )/d EL B). A sequent heorem prover which always 
proves the most general version of an inference can be immediately obtained from 
a (sound and complete) recursive axiomatization of the most general inferences of L, 
with help of most general sequent axioms and generality-preserving sequent rules 
(cf. Section 1.5). If applied to a factual knowledge base K, such a theorem prover 
would prove consequences of K by searching for a proof of most general sequents 
r FL B with a(r) = K for some substitution function a; each time it succeeds it will 
return the consequence C:= o(B), the relevant substitution function 0 and the 
underlying most general sequent r l-LB. - If such a theorem prover is implementent in 
a backward-chaining way, it will try to prove a goal C by searching for a proof of 
a most general sequent r I-,B with a(B) = C for some o and then searching for 
a proof of a(r). The difficulty here is that in the usual case several different sequents 
Ti l-L Bi with a( BJ = C for some d will be available, and an additional heuristics is 
needed which specifies the chances of finding a proof of a( 
Independent of the question how a theorem prover which proves always the most 
general version of a theorem can be implemented, the existence of a recursive 
axiomatization of the most general theorems or inferences of a given logic will be 
a necessary presupposition as well as a natural starting point of its implementation. 
Herein I see the interest of my question for theorem proving. By the way, besides the 
advantage of finding short proofs, a theorem prover of the described sort will enjoy 
a second advantage in systems where the derived theorems or inferences have to be 
stored for further application. This is, e.g., the case in models of belief revision based 
on dependency recording backtracking, as in [S]. It will be most economic to store 
only the most general versions of theorems, because all the other ones can be obtained 
from them by substitution. 
I .3. Relevance 
A second application comes from the field of relevant deductive inference. Rel- 
evance is an important desideratum of inference machines in rule-based expert 
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systems (cf. [7, 11, Section 5.41) or in inductive machine learning (cf. [9]). According 
to the approach developed by Schurz and Weingartner [ll, 143, a formula A is 
a relevant deductive consequence of a set of premises r (in a given logic L) if r kr. A 
and no predicate in A can be replaced on some of its occurrences by every other 
predicate (of the same arity), salua oaliditate of the inference. To check whether a given 
inference has a relevant conclusion requires to decide whether certain inferences are 
valid or not, which may be a rather complex procedure. For most genera1 inferences, 
however, it is easy to prove (cf. [12, p. 711) that they have a relevant conclusion iff all 
predicates of the conclusion occur also in the premise set, and the latter condition can 
be tested straightforwardly. Moreover, it follows from this connection that if the most 
genera1 inferences were recursively enumerable (r.e.), then the most genera1 inferences 
with relevant conclusions were r.e., too. This is of interest because it was proved by 
Schurz [l 1, p. 411 and independently by Osherson and Weinstein [9, p. 440) that the 
set of all classical first order inferences with relevant conclusions is not r.e. On 
independent reasons, Weingartner [15, p. 3281 has suggested a stronger notion of 
relevance, call it strict relevance, which adds the requirement of maxima1 generality to 
that of relevant conclusion, and, moreover, applies not only to inferences but to 
logical theorems of any sort, since it replaces the concept of “relevant conclusion” by 
that of “relevant positive subformula”. 
1.4. From closed I-terms to purely implicational propositional logic 
Generality w.r.t. substitution plays an important role in the study of the interre- 
lations between type assignment systems of combinatoric logic or ,I-calculus and 
propositional ogic (cf. [2,3,4]). Based on various earlier works it is demonstrated in 
Hindley and Meredith [2] how each type of a closed term corresponds to a purely 
implicational formula of propositional logic (the so-called Curry-Howard isomor- 
phism) and how different type assignment systems (TA systems) correspond to 
different systems of propositional ogic (classical, intuitionistic, relevance, BCK, BCI). 
A term has always many types which are closed under substitution, and it is of greatest 
interest o find the most general type of a term (which is also called its principal type). 
According to Hindley and Meredit [2, Theorem 6.73, the most general type schemata 
of TA systems are exactly the theorems provable in the corresponding propositional 
logic by the so-called condensed etachment rule. Most genera1 type schemata do not 
directly correspond to most genera1 theorems. But as shown by Hirokawa [4, 
Theorems 6.3 and 6.101, the most genera1 theorems of BCK-logics (he calls them the 
minimal ones) correspond exactly to the most genera1 types of closed BCK-A-terms in 
b-normal form (which are, roughly speaking, those closed terms which are not further 
reducible by contracting l-terms). Hirokawa proves that the most genera1 BCK- 
theorems have unique normal form proofs [4, p. 2541. Also because of these interre- 
lations it would be interesting to have an axiomatization of the most general theorems 
or inferences of BCK-logic (and similar logics). 
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1 S. Wrbnski’s axiomatization 
Motivated by these interrelations, W&ski [16] has given an axiomatization of the 
most general sequents (he speaks of worthwhile sequents) of the implication-conjunc- 
tion fragment of the contractionless propositional logic, which has as its algebraic 
counterpart he BCK-algebras with operation S. Wit 0, 01, O2 . . . (as well as 0, A) for 
formula sequences, P( 0) for the set of propositional variables in sequent 0, and F( 0) 
for the set of formulas contained in 0, Wr6nski’s axiomatization is as follows: 
The unique axiom: pl-p for PEP. 
Rules: 
(Al-): 0, A, B t-C/O, A A B I-C provided (i) A A B $ F( 0, C) and (ii) OF C 
(I- A): ell-A and 021-B/01 u&E-Ar\B provided B(01,A)n8(02,B) = 0 
(t- -+): 0, AI-B/OEA + B provided A + B$F(O) 
(-+ I-): O1 I-A and B, O2 l-C/A + B, 01, O2 I-C 
provided (i) 9(01,A) n B(B, Oz, C) = 8 and (ii) O2 l+ C 
(Weak): 0 i-A/O, p I-A provided p& and p $8(&I, A) 
(Exch.): 01, A, B, O2 I-C/O1, B, A, O2 HZ. 
1.6. The question 
It is conspicuous that the provisa (ii) of Wr6nski’s rules (A F) and (+ k) contain 
an underivability condition. So, the recursiveness of this axiomatization presupposes 
the decidability of the underlying derivability relation F. (To fix terminology, we call 
an axiomatization recursive iff for each formula and each premises-conclusion pair it 
is decidable whether it is instance of an axiom or a rule, respectively. Recursive 
axiomatizability implies recursive enumerability, and finite axiomatizability is 
a special case of it.) The following question arises: Is it possible to axiomatize the set of 
most general theorems or inferences without such inbuilt underivability conditions, 
such that the recursiveness of the axiomatization does not presuppose the decidability 
of the underlying logic? Or can it generally be proved, in the opposite, that a recursive 
axiomatization of most general theorems is possible only if the underlying logic is 
decidable? 
There is one ticklish point in answering this question. In the search for an 
axiomatization of the most general theorems we assume, of course, that no essential 
information gets lost in such an axiomatization. In other words, we presuppose that 
substitutions have the following property “ExMax” (existence of maxima): 
(ExMax) Each L-theorem is an instance of a most general L-theorem 
i.e. L = a( Gen, (L)). 
It is easy to prove this property for propositional logic, because the number of 
generalizations of a given propositional formula A modulo =, is finite (for, each 
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generalization replaces a subformula of A by a propositional variable), whence there 
must exist a maximal generalization (unique modulo = ,) which still is an L-theorem. 
Surprisingly, it will turn out in Section 2 that for the usual definition of o-substitutions 
in predicate logic, (ExMax) is not generally satisfied. However, a slightly restricted 
definition of substitutions is possible, so-called argument-conserving substitutions, for 
which (ExMax) holds, and we will answer our question for this kind of substitutions. 
To fix terminology, ~7 will vary in the following always over arbitrary substitutions 
for predicate letters, while E varies only over argument-conserving o-substitutions 
(a and E are defined in Section 2). Finally, n varies over simple predicate-substitutions; 
these are uniform replacements of predicates by predicates of the same arity. In 
predicate logic, K is a subcase of E which is a subcase of 0, while in propositional ogic, 
all three coincide. K- and s-substitutions atisfy the property (ExMax) while a-substi- 
tutions do not. To make the reference to the given kind of substitution functions 
explicit, we will speak from now on always of “a-generality”, “a-generality” and 
‘%-generality”. 
Throughout the following, L ranges over all logics extending intuitionistic proposi- 
tional or first logic (cf., e.g. [l, pp. 434f] - the so-called intermediate logics. So, L is 
a subset of the propositional or first order language containing the intuitionistic 
(propositional or first order) logic and being closed under MP, V-generalization rule 
and o-substitution rule. We will prove that given L is recursively enumerable (r.e.), 
then the sets of L’s most s-general and L’s most n-general theorems are r.e. only if L is 
decidable. Note that also the other direction of the theorem is true, but on trivial 
reasons. The same result holds, of course, for the recursive enumerability of L- 
inferences (because they are definable via r l---,A iff /j\r, + A E L for finite F, E F). 
The result is also transferrable to modal logics, as indicated in the end of the paper. 
The theorem implies a limitation to the search for recursive axiomatizations of the 
most general theorems of a logic. It tells us that the most general theorems of classical first 
order logic (but also those of various further logics which are undecidable) are not r.e. The 
very general upshot of this result is that if a logic is undecidable, then its semi-decidability 
(i.e. its recursive numerability) is not really a big ‘compensation’ of this lack of decidabil- 
ity, because its most interesting theorems, namely its most general ones, will not even be 
semidecidable. Our theorem implies this limitation only for E- and rr-generality, while the 
question of the recursive numerability of the most a-general theorems remains an open 
problem. But most E- and a-general theorems are more important insofar they satisfy 
(ExMax) and so never loose ‘essential’ information, while in the set of most a-general 
theorems certain L-theorems are missing. Also the question under which conditions 
L-theorems have o-maximal L-generalizations i an open problem. 
2. Substitution for predicate letters 
We assume the language of first order predicate logic Y, being identified with the 
set of its well-formed formulas, which are built up from (i) a set V of individual 
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variables (x, y, . . .; u, u, . . . ), (ii) a set 9 = U { 9” 1 n 2 0} of n-ary function symbols 
(1; g, . ..). where so:= X is the set of individual constants (a, b, . ..). a set 
9I? = U { 8” I n 2 0) of n-ary predicate letters (F, G, . . . , R, Q, . . .), where 9’ := 9 is the 
set of propositional variables, and (iv) the undefined logical symbols 1, A, v , + , V, 
3, T (verum), I (falsum), and E for the identity predicate. (A HZ? := (A + B) A 
(B + A) is a defined symbol. If the logic is classical then, of course, + , A, 3 are 
definable by 1, v , V in the usual way. We include T and I as primitives because this 
simplifies the proof.) The set of all terms 9 and the set of all formulas 9 is defined in 
the usual way. The set of all predicates occurring in formula A or formula set r is 
denoted by W(A) and 9(Z), respectively; similar for P(A), ^Ir( A), etc. The notions of 
free and bound occurrences of individual variables in formulas are explained as usual. 
The result of the simultaneous ubstitution of term Ii for xi in formula A (for 1 < i < n) 
is denoted by A[tl/xl,..., t&c.] and defined as the result of replacing every free 
occurrence Of Xi by ti in A*, where A* is the first alphabetic variant of A (cf. Section 1) 
in which no free xi-occurrence lies in the scope of a quantifier binding a variable of ti, 
according to a fixed enumeration of the formulas of 9’. (The inductive definitions of 
these notions are well known; cf., e.g. [l, Ch. 2, Section 31.) We will make use of the 
following abbreviations: x1 _,, abbreviates x1, . . . . x., Rxl_, abbr. Rx1 . . . x., Vx, _,, 
abbr. Vx 1 . . . Vx,, A[tl_,J~l_n] abbr. A[tl/xl, . . . . t./x,]. 
Let us give a brief explanation of the concept of a-substitution. Our explication 
follows that of Kleene (cf. [6, pp. 155-1621.) The only difference is that Kleene defines 
r~ only for those formulas where no renaming of bound variables is needed to exclude 
confusion of variables. A slightly different but equivalent explication can be found in 
[lo]). Consider an n-ary predicate R. We assume it to be attached with pairwise 
distinct variables z1 _“, which figure as name form variables carrying the substitution 
for Rzl_,. Take a formula B which shall be substituted for Rzl_,. It is neither 
required that B contains all of the name form variables z1 _” nor that it contains only 
them as free variables. The free variables in B which are not name form variables of 
Rz, _” are called the anonymous variables in B. Uniform substitution of formula B for 
R in formula A means replacing each occurrence of Rt, _” (where ti are any terms 
in F, not necessarily distinct) by the corresponding B-substitution-instance 
Z3 [cl _Jzl _.I in A*, where A* is the first alphabetic variant of A which contains no 
quantifier binding an anonymous variable of B. We assume from now on a fixed 
infinite set of pairwise distinct variables { zl, . . . . Zir . ..} figuring as name form vari- 
ables for a-substitutions. 
More formally, a substitution function for predicates is a mapping (T : W + Y, and 
aA - the result of substituting oR for each predicate R in A - is inductively defined as 
follows: (1) a(Rtl . . . tn) = (aR)[tl_./xl_,,]. (2) If A = lZ3 or BoC with OE{ A, v, 
-+ }, then oA = lag or (aB 0 aC), respectively. (3) a(VxB) = Vx*aB*, where Vx*B* 
is the first alphabetic variant of VxB such that its outermost quantifier binds no 
anonymous variable of some aR with REW(B). (We often use brackets and write 
“a(A)” to exclude confusions of any sort.) ExampIes: Let F, G be unary, R, H, I, 
Q binary, aF = Hz,x, aG = Zxzr, aR = (3xHzlx + Qzlzz). (i) g(Vy(Fy~ Gy + 
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3uRyu)) = Vy(Hyx A Ixy + 3u(3xHyx --f Qyu)); here no renaming of bound vari- 
ables is necessary. (ii) o(Rxu) = 3x*Hxx* + QXU, where 3x*Hzix* + QzlzZ is the 
first alphabetic variant of 3xHzix -+ Qzlzz containing no quantifier binding x. 
(Without renaming of 3x into 3x* we would have arrived at 3xHxx + Qxu - the 
underlining indicates the confusion of variables.) (iii) o(Vx( Gu A Rxu)) = 
Vx**(lxu A (3x*Hx**x* -, Qx **u)) (without renaming of Vx into Vx**, the anony- 
mous variable x of aG would have become bound). A ‘degenerated’ substitution: If 
aH = q and aQ = p, then o(Vx3y(Hxx + Qxy)) = Vx3y(q + p)-i k q + p. The 
well-known facts about a-substitutions are: (1) first order logic (classical as well as 
intuitionistic) is closed under a-substitutions; (2) o-substitutions are transitive: for each 
c1 and (TV there exists a o3 (defined by a3R = azalR for each R&f) such that cr3A 
is an alphabetic variant of ozalR for all AEY (proofs can be found in [6, pp. 159-161, 
13, pp. 89ff, 10, pp. 87f, 89f-J). 
We call a substitution function CJ reversible w.r.t. an (n-ary) predicate R in a formula 
A iff: (i) oR is an atomic formula different from RzI_, containing all name form 
variables z1 _,, among its argument places and (ii) oR # aQ for all Q # REW(A). 
A substitution function 0 is called nonredundant w.r.t. A iff CJ is not reversible w.r.t. any 
predicate in A (else c is redundant w.r.t. A). So, if CT is nonredundant w.r.t. to A, then 
D either ‘glues’ certain predicates in A or it replaces them by complex formulas or it 
leaves them unchanged, but D will never replace them by other predicates in a unique 
(and thus reversible) manner. Let bR denote the substitution function (r restricted to 
R (i.e. oRR = oR and cRQ = Q for Q # R). If 0 is reversible w.r.t. R in A, then 0, r has 
an inverse ai1 such that oRa,‘A = A. (If oR = Qtl_m, then ai1 is defined by 
cri ‘Q = Rzilp a.. 9 Zi,,, where il, . . . , i, are the place numbers of the first leftmost 
occurrences of the variables zl, . . . , z, in the string tl _,,,. Example: if R is binary 
and oRR = Qzzvzl, then o, ‘Q = Rz3zl. So o,(Rab) = Qbua, and gi ’ (Qbua) = 
Rz3zl[b/z1,u/zZ,a/z3] = Rub). 
It follows that whenever (T is reversible w.r.t. R in A, c~RA := A* is equally a-general 
as A, and there exists a substitution function rr* such that oA = cr*A*, where cr* is like 
c except hat it does not change the predicate of oR. Hence, A* contains one predicate 
less w.r.t. which 6* is reversible, compared with A and cr. If we replace in this manner 
all predicates in A w.r.t. which CT is reversible, we obtain a formula A** and substitu- 
tion function cr** such that A is equally a-general as A**, a**A** = aA, and e** is 
nonredundant w.r.t. A**. It follows that whenever an L-theorem B is an instance of 
a most general L-theorem A, then there exists a most o-general L-theorem A’ such 
that B is an instance of A’ via a nonredundant substitution function. This allows us to 
restrict the attention on nonredundant substitution functions in the proof of our 
theorem. 
As mentioned in Section 1, a-substitutions do not satisfy (ExMax). The reason is 
that in u-substitutions name form variables may get dropped, and if so, a a-substi- 
tution can be irreversible even if it sends only distinct atomic formulas to distinct 
predicates. To give an example, if R is binary and aR = FzI, then 
a(Ruv V-I Ruw) = Fu V-I Fu, and no a-function leads from Fu VT Fu back to 
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Ruv V-I Ruw. It follows that every formula A which contains at least one predicate 
R twice has always an infinite set of a-generalizations, just by replacing two atomic 
formulas Rt,_, and Rt;_, in A by atomic formulas of the form Qtl_,,,u1u2 . . . and 
Qt;_,,,v1v2 . .. . respectively, with predicates of increasing arity. Of course, the infinite 
set of o-generalizations of A has a maximum (modulo Ed), namely p. But if A is an 
L-theorem, nothing guarantees that the set of L-o-generalizations of A (i.e. the set of 
all o-generalizations of A which are L-theorems) has a maximum, too. E.g., the 
L-theorem 
VxVy(x = y) + (Fxv1Fy) (1) 
has the infinite set of L-a-generalizations with increasing generality 
{VxVy(x = y) --* (R”+l~~l~Z...u,~~R”+lyvlvz...v,)(n~o}, (2) 
theorems of first order l:gic. 
is an infinite set of pairwise distinct individual variables. where {x,y,ui ,.... v1 ,... 
Thus neither (1) nor any a-generalization of it will be among the set of most a-general 
It is reasonable, therefore, to restrict a-substitutions to argument-conserving substi- 
tution functions E: E ranges over all those o-substitution functions which assign to 
each n-ary predicate R a formula aR which contains all the name form variables 
Zlr..., n z (attached to R) free. This excludes cases like the above where name form 
variables get dropped. It is clear that s-substitutions satisfy (ExMax), since the number 
of s-generalizations of a formula A modulo Go is finite (because the number of 
formulas B such that B[ tl _Jzl_J is a subformula of A and z1 _,EV~(B) is finite, and 
every o-generalization of A results from replacing some of these B [ t 1 _ ,,/zl _ J-subfor- 
mulas of A by possibly distinct atomic formulas Qetl _.). 
A n-substitution function is an even simpler kind which uniformly replaces predi- 
cates by predicates of the same arity. It is a function rc: W + W such that QEW” 
implies rrQ ES?“, and its extension to formulas is inductively defined by: 
4Qu1 . ..u.) = (nQ)ul . ..u.; niA = inA, n(AoB) = (nAonB) for OE{~, v, 
A, -P > and nVuA = VuaA. No renamings of bound variables are necessary. A K- 
substitution coincides with a corresponding c-substitution E, (defined by 
sn(Q) = (nQ)z, _,, for QE~?“). Obviously, rr-substitutions satisfy (ExMax). 
3. The theorem 
A formula AEP’ is called maximally short iff there exists no BEY which is logically 
equivalent but shorter than A. Thereby, the length of a formula is the number of its 
symbols provided all defined symbols are replaced by primitives. The only maximally 
short L-theorem is T, and the only maximally short contradiction is I, while 
contingent formulas may have maximally short equivalents of various kinds. An 
important fact for our proof is 
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(*) Whenever some occurrences of proper subformulas of A can be replaced by T or 
l_ without changing the logical content of A, then A is not maximally short. 
The proof of ( *) is obvious: Assume A* is the result of such a replacement, so 
I-,_ A t) A*. Certainly A* is not longer than A. T or _L will occur in A* in one of the 
following subformulas at the left, and these can be replaced by the following shorter 
formulas at the right: 1 T ttI,llerT,(BvT)[TvB]t,T,(BvI)[IvB]trB, 
(BAT) [TAB]++& (BAG) [IAB-J crlT, (B-+T)t,T, (B-+_L)++lB, 
( T -+ B) c, B, (I + B) t, T. Because all these equivalences are theorems of our logic 
L (which extends, recall, intuitionistic propositional or first order logic), and the law of 
replacing logical equivalents holds in L, the result of this replacement will lead to 
a formula A** which is logically equivalent with A* and thus with A, but shorter than 
A* and thus shorter than A. 
The basic idea of the proof of our theorem is to try to find an effectively construct- 
ible function f: 9 + 28 which associates with every formula A a formula f(A) such 
that A is L-consistent iff f(A) is a most E-general L-theorem. Together with the 
assumed r.(ecursive) e.(numeration) of L-theorems, the r.e. of most &-general L-the- 
orems gives us a decision procedure for L-theoremhood: for any formula A, either 
A will appear in the r.e. of L-theorems (iff A is an L-theorem), or f(l A) will appear in 
the r.e. of most z-general L-theorems (iff A is not an L-theorem). Although it is not 
possible to define such a function which works for every A, we will succeed in defining 
a function which works for each formula which is maximally short. Since every 
formula A has an L-equivalent version A’ which is maximally short, this will be 
sufficient o produce a decision procedure from the assumed r.e. of L-theorems and of 
most E-general L-theorems. Our theorems rests on the following lemma. 
Main Lemma. Zf A contains no identity predicate, is maximally short, and distinct from 
T and I, then the formula 
f(A):= Id(A,A*) + (p~A~pr\ A*) 
is a most z-general theorem of L, where 
(i) A* results from a unique reletrering of A’s predicates by starred predicates, i.e. 
A* = TTA, where 7t : 9(A) + W( A*) is bijectiue and B(A) n W( A*) = 8; 
(ii) p is a new variable, i.e., p $ W(A, A*); 
(iii) Id(A,A*):= l\{Vxl_,(Rxl_, c, R*xl_,)I&W”(A), neo}. 
Proof. Assume A satisfies the assumptions of the lemma. If W( A) = 0, then A is built 
up solely from T and _L and thus is either T or _l or is not maximally short, but all 
three cases contradict the assumptions. It follows that W(A) # 8. Note that A must be 
L-consistent, for otherwise, A = J_ (since A is maximally short), contradicting the 
assumption. Id(A, A*) is L-consistent (on trivial semantical reasons). f(A):= 
Id(A, A*) + (PA A-p/\ A*) is an L-theorem by virtue of the quantifier theorems 
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and the law of replacing equivalents ((A c* B) + (C w C [ C/B])) of intuitionistic 
logic. 
Now assume that f(A) is not a most e-general L-theorem. Then there exists a most 
s-general L-theorem B and a substitution function E which is nonredundant w.r.t. 
B such that f(A)’ = EB and f(A)’ # B holds for some alphabetic variant S(A)’ of 
f(A). For terminological simplicity we arrange that from now on we mean with f(A), 
A and A* always the alphabetic variants of these formulas; of course they also satisfy 
the assumptions of the main lemma. We may also assume (by predicate-relettering in 
B) that 
(+) Each predicate in B which is changed by E does not occur in A or A*. 
We proceed stepwise, proving each step by deriving a contradiction. In what 
follows, At stands always for an atomic formula, and P(At) for its predicate. 
First, we show that B has the form B1 + (B2 t) B3) with eB1 = Id(A, A*), 
&BZ = p A A and eB3 = p A A*. If not, then either B must be an atomic formula, which 
cannot be an L-theorem; or it must be of the form B1 + At, with 
&At =(p~Atrpr\A*). Certainly P(At)$W(B,), because p$Id(A,A*); so again, 
B1 + At cannot be a theorem (which is proved, e.g. by substituting _l for P(At), which 
yields l-r B1 --) I, contradicting the fact that Id( A, A*) and hence B1 is L-consistent). 
Second, we show that B, and B3 cannot be atomic formulas. Assume on the 
contrary that B2 = At. Because &At = A contains p .$ Id(A, A*), P(At) cannot be in 
Bl, and because &At contains only unstarred predicates which are not in A*, P(At) 
cannot be in B3. Again we show that in this case that B1 + (At w B3) cannot be an 
L-theorem. Let CJ be the function which assigns I to P(At) (and does nothing else) and 
let rc- ’ be the inverse of R, which replaces each R*&‘(A*) by R. By applying first 6, 
then E and finally rc-i to B1 + (At c, B3), we then obtain rrL- ’ Id(A, A*) + 
(I -71 -lA*) as an L-theorem, where II- lId(A,A*)=Id(A,A)=~{Vxl_,(Rx,_, 
*Rx1 _,, 1 REW”(A), no) is an L-theorem, and rr- ‘A* = A; hence, we obtain 
I H A as an L-theorem, contradicting the L-consistency of A. It follows that B2 must 
have the form of a conjunction. Its left conjunct B2,1 must be a propositional variable 
since EB~,~ = p and E is argument-conserving. By the same proof, B3 cannot be atomic, 
but must be a conjunction with the left conjunct a propositional variable. 
Third, we show that B2 and B3 must have the forms p A C1 and p A C1, respectively, 
with cc1 = A and cC1 = A*. Otherwise, they have the forms q1 A Ci and q2 A C2 (by 
step 2) with q1 # q2 and EqI = Eq2 = p, because E is nonredundant w.r.t. B. Neither 
q1 nor q2 is in W( B1, Ci, C,), because p $ W(Id(A, A*), A, A*). Let E* be like E except 
that it leaves q1 and q2 unchanged. Applying E* to B gives us 
kr, Id( A, A*) --, ( q1 A A c* q2 A A*). If we apply the function n- ’ (as in step 2 above), 
we get Id( A, A) + (ql A A-q2 A A) and thus (ql A A c*q2 A A) as an L-theorem. 
Substituting I for q1 and T for q2, this gives us I c, A, contradicting the L- 
consistency of A.-Summarized, B has the form 
(**) B1 + (p A Cl up A C,), with eB1 = Id(A, A*), &Cl = A and eC2 = A*. 
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Fourth, we show that B1 must be identical with Id(A, A*). Assume otherwise. Then 
one of the following cases must apply. 
Case 1: B1 contains an n-ary predicate Q such that EQ = Rzl_, for some n-ary 
R&(A) with Q # R. Q can occur in B1 only once, because ach R (and R*) occurs in 
Id( A, A*) only once. Q cannot occur in Cz (because .zCZ does not contain R), but it 
may occur in Cr. Because E is nonredundant and hence irreversible w.r.t. Q, there must 
be at least one further predicate Q’ # Q in C1 such that EQ’ = EQ = Rzl _“. Q’ cannot 
be in B1, because R occurs in Id(A, A*) only once. Q’ must also be different from 
p (because p 4 &?(A)); finally, the assumption ( + ) above guarantees that Q’ is also 
different from any predicate in R(A) or W(A*). Let a* be a substitution like 
E except that it leaves the predicate Q’ unchanged. Applying a* to B gives us 
l-,Id(A,A*) + (PA~(Q’)ttpAA*),whereA(Q’)islikeAexceptsomeoccurrences 
of the predicate R are replaced by Q’. We apply n- ’ to the latter theorem and get 
(again, because Id(A, A) is an L-theorem) FL p A A( Q’) (--) p A A. From that we obtain 
t-L A( Q’) *--) A by substituting T for p, and finally FL A(T) c-, A by substituting T for 
Q’, where A(T) is like A except hat some (proper) atomic subformulas are replaced by 
T. From the fact (*) above it follows that A(T) and thus A is L-equivalent o a shorter 
formula A’. So, A is not maximally short, contradicting the assumption. 
Case 2: B1 contains an n-ary predicate Q with EQ = R*zl . . . z, for some n-ary 
R*&(A*). The treatment of this case is like before, resulting again in the observation 
that then A cannot be maximally short. 
Case 3: B1 contains a predicate Q such that for some n-ary R&?(A), EQ is one of 
the following formulas: (a) Rxl_,oR*xl_,, (b) VX~_~(RX~_,,C)R*X~_~), or (c) 
a conjunction of formulas of the form (b) which is a subformula of Id(A, A*). Since 
none of the formulas (a)-(c) occurs in (p A A -p A A*) as a subformula, 
Q $ W( C1 , Cz, p) must hold. Again, Q can occur in B1 only once (because the formulas 
(a)-(c) occur in Id( A, A*) only once). By the assumption ( + ) above we also have that 
Q $ W( A, A*). Let E* be like E except that it substitutes T for Q. Applying E* to B and 
eliminating T gives us t--,Id’( A, A*) + (p A A-p A A*), where Id’(A, A*) is a con- 
junction like Id( A, A*) except hat for at least one predicate, say PEW(A), the formula 
Vxr _n(Pxl ._” c, P*xl _n) is missing in Id’( A, A*). Let (a- ’ )’ be like 7c-i above except 
that it leaves the predicate P unchanged. By applying (n-l)’ to 
F,Id’(A,A*) + (p~A++pr\A*) we obtain I--,Id’(A,A) + (p”Attp~A(P*)), 
where Id’( A, A) is again an L-theorem and A( P*) is like A except that it contains P* 
where A contains P. So FL(p A A-p A A(P*); and by substituting T for p as well as 
for P* we arrive at the L-theorem A t) A( T) (where A(T) results from A by replacing 
proper atomic P-subformulas by T). This again implies, by the fact (*) above, that A is 
not maximally short, and hence a contradiction. - Summarized, B must have the form 
(***) Id(A, A*) + (p A C1 wp A C,), with cC1 = A and aCZ = A*. 
Fifth, we finally show that Ci = A and C2 = A* must hold in (***). Assume that 
C1 # A. Then Ct must contain a predicate Q which gets replaced via E by some 
formula containing W( A)-predicates. The crucial point is that Q cannot be in Cz since 
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aCZ = A* contains no 9(A)-predicates. Also Q # p must hold, and Q # %‘(A, A*) by 
the assumption (+). So again, we let E* be like E except hat it leaves Q unchanged; and 
arrive, by applying E* to (*** ), at the L-theorem Id(A,A*) + (p A A(Q)- 
p A A*) (where A results from A(Q) by substituting EQ for Q). We apply n-l to this 
theorem, getting p A A(Q) *p A A as an L-theorem (because FL Id( A, A)), and finally, 
by substituting T for p as well as for Q, we obtain t-L A(T) f-, A (where A(T) results 
from A by replacing some proper atomic subformula occurrences by T ). This shows, 
again, that A is not maximally short, contradicting the assumption. 
The case where C2 # A* is treated completely similar. It follows that B is identical 
with f(A), whence f(A) is most s-general. 0 
With help of the main lemma it is easy to prove the following lemma. 
Consistency Lemma. Given that A contains no identity predicate, then: A is L-consis- 
tent iff either I-,, A or there exists an A’ such that t-L A f+ A’ and f (A’) is a most 
e-general L-theorem. The same is true if “s-general” is replaced by “n-general”. 
Proof. Direction * of the “3” follows just from the main lemma and the fact that 
each A has a maximally short L-equivalent version A’. Direction -Z : If t-r A, then A is 
L-consistent on trivial reasons. If there exists an A’ with I-, At, A’ and 
f(A’):= Id(A’, A’*) + (p A A’ up A A’*) is a most s-general L-theorem, then A’ and 
thus A must be L-consistent, for otherwise the replacement of one p-occurrence in 
f(A’) by a new variable q $f(A’) would lead to a proper a-generalization of f(A’) 
which is still an L-theorem. The claim for z-generality follows in the same way, 
because (i) a most s-general theorem is also most rc-general, and (ii) if A is L- 
inconsistent, then f(A’) is not most K-general, too. 0 
Given that L is r.e. and that L’s most s-general theorems are r.e., the consistency 
lemma allows us to define the following decision procedure for L-theoremhood. 
Theorem. Let L be an recursively enumerable (r.e.) logic in 55’ which extends intuitionis- 
tic propositional or first order logic. Then the set of L’s most e-general theorems is 
r.e. (if and) only if L is decidable. The same is true for the set of L’s most n-general 
theorems. 
Proof. We first eliminate the identity predicate in the given formula A by the usual 
method (which works for classical as well as for intuitionistic logic; cf. [l, p. loll), 
obtaining an identity-free formula A+ such that A is L-valid (L-consistent) iff A+ is 
L-valid (L-consistent). We apply the following procedure to our formula A+. 
Let Th(n) (n = 1,2 . ..) be the recursive enumeration of L-theorems and Gen(n) 
(n = 1,2, . ..) the recursive enumeration of most s-general (or n-general, respectively) 
L-theorems. List-Th( n) and List-Gen(n) are the lists of L-theorems and most E- 
general (z-general) L-theorems enumerated until step n. List-Th(0) and List-Gen(0) 
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are set to 0. Each step of the procedure with number n consists of the following three 
finite subprocedures. 
(1) Compute Th( n). If Th( n) = A +, then result: (A+ and thus) A is an L-theorem. If 
Th(n) = iA+, then result: (A+ and thus) A is L-inconsistent and thus not an 
L-theorem. (2) Compute Gen(n). Put List-Th(n) = List-Th(n - 1) u {Th(n)} and 
List-Gen( n) = List-Gen( n - 1) u ( Gen( n)}. (3) Check for each formula 1 A+ t, B in 
List-Th(n) whether f(B) is in List-Gen(n). If yes, then result: 1 A+ is L-consistent (by 
the consistency lemma) and hence (A+ and thus) A is not an L-theorem. 
It remains to show that this procedure must halt after a finite number of steps. If 
A is an L-theorem, there exists a number kl such that A+ = Th(kl) and the procedure 
halts at step kl. If A is L-inconsistent, there exists a number k2 such that 
lA+ = Th(kz) and the procedure halts at step k2. In the remaining case, where A is 
neither an L-theorem nor L-inconsistet, 1 A (and thus 1 A+) must be L-consistent, 
whence by the consistency lemma there exists a number k3 and a formula B such that 
-I A+ c* B = Th(k3) and a number k4 such that f(B) = Gen( k4). In this case, the 
procedure halts at the step max( ( k3, k,}). El 
Subprocedure (3) requires a nested search through two finite lists. Note that it may 
be equivalently defined in the following more economic way, which avoids performing 
the same subprocedures several times: If Th( n) has the form 1 A+ H B or B W-I A+ 
(for some B) then search for f(B) in List-Gen( n - 1). If Gen( n) has the form f(B) (for 
some B), then search for 1 A+ c) B or B -1 A+ in List-Th(n - 1). 
We finally remark that our theorem goes through also for modal (propositional or 
first order) logics. All the assumed theorems and rules of L holds also in intuitionistic 
or classical modal logics, except the law of replacing equivalents (A-B) + 
(C t) C[ B/A]) used in the beginning of the proof of the main lemma. Let dg( A) be the 
modal degree of A, this is the maximal number of nested occurrences of boxes in C. 
The following modified law is a theorem of (intuitionistic and classical) modal logics: 
q detc)( A t, B) + (C t* C[ B/A]), where q ” means q iterated n times. So, we simply 
have to redefine the function f as follows: f(A) := q dgfA) Id(A, A*) + (p A A w 
p A A*). With this modification, the proof goes through as before. 
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